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ABSTRACT. This paper examines whether an agent becomes liable to defensive
harm by engaging in amorally permissible but foreseeably risk-imposing activity that
subsequently threatens objectively unjustified harm. It first clarifies the notion of a
foreseeably risk-imposing activity by proposing that an activity should count as fore-
seeably risk-imposing if an agent may morally permissibly perform it only if she
abides by certain duties of care. Those who argue that engaging in such an activity
can render an agent liable to defensive harm ground this liability in the luck egali-
tarian thought that we may justly hold individuals responsible for the consequences
of their voluntary choices. Against this, I argue that a luck egalitarian commitment to
holding people responsible cannot, by itself, ground liability to defensive harm. It can
help ground such liability only against the backdrop of a distributively just society, and
only if further considerations speak morally in favour of attaching certain well-defined
costs to individuals’ risk-imposing choices. I conclude by suggesting that if an account
of liability applies robustly across distributively just and unjust contexts alike, then
what grounds an agent’s liability is plausibly not her responsibility for threatening
objectively unjustified harm, but her culpability for doing so.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to theMoral Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive
Harm (ResponsibilityAccount, for short), it can be permissible to harm a
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person in self-defence even if that person is not at fault for the threat they
pose.1Consider the example of a conscientious driver.2This driver always
keeps her car well-maintained and always drives carefully. One fateful
evening, her car nevertheless veers out of control, threatening to kill a
pedestrian. Defenders of the Responsibility Account claim that if the
pedestrian can save his own life only by killing the driver, then he is
morally permitted to do so, because the driver is morally responsible for
threatening the pedestrian, and for this reason lacks a right against
whatever necessary and proportionate defensive harm the pedestrian
might impose on her. Due to her conscientiousness, the driver is not
blameworthy for threatening the pedestrian, but she is nevertheless
responsible, as it was foreseeable to her that deciding to drive might
result in a threat of unjustified harm. By contrast, if someone threatens
unjustified harm through an action where no harm was foreseeable,
then they are not responsible for the threat they are posing, and are
therefore not liable to defensive harm. Consider the example of an
unsuspecting homeowner who will cause a lightning flash in a neigh-
bouring house if he flips a light switch in his hallway.3 The homeowner
was not able to foresee that flipping the switchmight result in a threat of
unjustified harm, and is thus neither responsible for threatening his
neighbour, nor liable to defensive harm.
In this paper, I critically examine the Responsibility Account. I
first explore whether it is possible to make sense of the claim that a
person such as the conscientious driver was able to foresee that her
actions might threaten harm in a way that a person such as the
unsuspecting homeowner was not. I conclude that a principled line
between the two agents can indeed be drawn. While this is good
news for the Responsibility Account, which relies on distinguishing
these cases, I go on to argue that the Responsibility Account fails to
be backed up by a satisfactory rationale.
1 Central defences of the Responsibility Account include Jeff McMahan, ‘The Basis of Moral Liability
to Defensive Killing’, Philosophical Issues 15(1) (2005): pp. 386–405; Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009a); Jeff McMahan, ‘Self-Defense Against Morally Innocent
Threats’, in P. H. Robinson, S. P. Garvey and K. K. Ferzan (eds.), Criminal Law Conversations (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009b), pp. 385–394; Michael Otsuka, ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 23(1) (1994): pp. 74–94; Michael Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account
of Liability to Defensive Killing’, in C. Coons and M. Weber (eds), The Ethics of Self-Defense (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 51–68; Kerah Gordon-Solmon, ‘What Makes a Person Liable to
Defensive Harm?’, Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 97(3) (2018): pp. 543–567.
2 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165.
3 Judith Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 229.
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When it comes to drawing a principled line between an agent such
as the conscientious driver and an agent such as the homeowner, I
contend that we are facing a dilemma. On a first understanding of
foreseeability, foreseeability is tied to fault, and on this understanding,
neither the driver nor the homeowner could foresee the harm that they
threaten. On a second understanding, foreseeability is likened to
conceivability, and on this second understanding, both the driver and
the homeowner could foresee the harms they threaten. I propose that
we can escape this dilemma by adopting an understanding of fore-
seeable risk imposition that focuses on duties of care. In order to be
morally permitted to drive, the conscientious driver had to abide by
well-defined duties of care. No comparable duties applied to the
homeowner. I argue that this renders the driver’s actions foreseeably
risk-imposing in a way that the homeowner’s are not.
I then considerwhether the Responsibility Account has an adequate
rationale. Its proponents claim that it is fairer, and hence distributively
more just, if an agent who is morally responsible for a threat of unjus-
tified harm has to suffer that harm. They substantiate this claim by
appealing to the luck egalitarian idea that it is distributively just to hold
individuals to account for the consequences of their voluntary choices.
Against this proffered justification, I argue that a commitment to
holding individuals responsible cannot, by itself, ground foreseeable
risk-imposers’ defensive liability.More precisely, I show that it can help
ground such liability only if independentmoral reasons speak in favour
of holding foreseeable risk-imposers accountable in this way. More-
over, an appeal to responsibility has justificatory force only if fore-
seeable risk-imposers are aware of the costs that they are asked to
internalise, and only if their choices take place against a backdrop of
substantive equality of opportunity. I conclude by suggesting that if the
factors that render an agent liable to defensive harm remain constant
across distributively just and unjust contexts alike, then what grounds
such liability is plausibly not an agent’s responsibility for threatening
objectively unjustified harm, but her culpability for doing so.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the
Responsibility Account. In section 3, I investigate how we might
make sense of the notion of foreseeability that it relies on. In sec-
tion 4, I discuss whether it is just to hold foreseeable risk-imposers to
account for the harms that they threaten. Section 5 concludes.
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II. THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNT OF LIABILITY TO DEFENSIVE
HARM
Consider the following cases:
The Conscientious Driver.4 A person who always keeps her car well-maintained and always
drives carefully decides to drive to the cinema. On the way, her car veers out of control in the
direction of a pedestrian, threatening the pedestrian with lethal harm. The pedestrian can avoid
being run over by throwing a grenade towards the oncoming car. If this is the only way of
defending himself, is it morally permissible for the pedestrian to kill the driver?
Day’s End.5 A homeowner always comes home at 9 p.m. and flips the light switch in his
hallway. He is about to do so this evening. The homeowner’s flipping the switch causes a circuit
to close. By virtue of an extraordinary series of coincidences, on this particular evening the
circuit’s closing will cause a lightning flash in a nearby house. If the homeowner flips the switch,
the resulting lightning flash will kill his neighbour. If the neighbour can prevent the homeowner
from flipping the switch only by killing him, is it morally permissible for the neighbour to kill the
homeowner?
Proponents of the Responsibility Account argue that there is a crucial
difference between the two cases that renders the driver, but not the
homeowner, liable to defensive harm. The driver’s liability then makes
it permissible for the pedestrian to defend himself against the driver,
whereas the homeowner’s neighbour lacks a similar liability-based
justification in favour of defending himself.6
If a person is liable to a particular harm, then they are not
wronged if the harm is imposed on them. On the Responsibility
Account, what grounds a person’s liability to defensive harm is her
moral responsibility for a threat of harm that is objectively unjustified.7 A
threat of harm is objectively unjustified if it results from an action that
lacks objective moral justification, so that it would have been
impermissible to perform the action had the agent, at the time of
acting, been aware of all the morally relevant facts, including all the
morally relevant consequences of her alternatives for action.
Importantly for our purposes, proponents of the Responsibility Ac-
count claim that a person can be morally responsible for a threat of
unjustified harm without being blameworthy for it. On their
understanding of moral responsibility, blameworthiness for a bad
4 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165.
5 Thomson, Realm of Rights, p. 229.
6 Even if the homeowner is not liable to defensive harm, the neighbour may still be morally
permitted to defend himself. For a defence of such a permission, see Jonathan Quong, ‘Killing in Self-
Defense’, Ethics 119(3) (2009): pp. 507–537.
7 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 35.
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outcome8 presupposes moral responsibility for that outcome, but
when we act voluntarily and this leads to a bad outcome, we can
sometimes be morally responsible for the outcome while being be-
yond reproach. More precisely, defenders of the Responsibility Ac-
count argue that an agent is morally responsible for an outcome of
her action if, at the time of acting, the following conditions ob-
tained:9
1. The agent was of sound mind;
2. The agent was in control of what she was doing;
3. It was foreseeable to the agent that her action might result in the kind
of outcome that it actually resulted in.
I refer to the third condition above as the Foreseeability Condition.
Defenders of the Responsibility Account think that the conscientious
driver satisfies the Foreseeability Condition, whereas the unsus-
pecting homeowner does not.10 Here is what Jeff McMahan says
about the conscientious driver:
‘She does not intend to harm anyone and cannot foresee that she will harm anyone, but she
knows that driving is an activity that has a very tiny risk of causing great harm—so tiny that the
activity, considered as a type of activity, is entirely permissible.’11
The unsuspecting homeowner, by contrast, ‘does not choose to
engage in an activity that has a foreseeable risk of causing serious
harm’;12 he is ‘nonculpably and invincibly ignorant’ of the fact that
‘he poses any kind of threat or risk of harm to anyone.’13
Neither the conscientious driver nor the unsuspecting home-
owner is blameworthy for the harm that their actions threaten. But
unlike the unsuspecting homeowner, the conscientious driver chose
to engage in an activity that she knew, or should have known,
imposed a risk of harm on innocent others. For defenders of the
Responsibility Account, this fact about the driver’s epistemic situa-
8 In the context of this paper, I assume that a threat of harm qualifies as an outcome of an action even if
the threat never materialises because it is successfully averted.
9 Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’, p. 52.
10 Ibid., p. 64.
11 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165, original emphasis.
12 Ibid., p. 166.
13 McMahan, ‘Self-Defense Against Morally Innocent Threats’, p. 394. In the passages just quoted,
McMahan is not talking about the unsuspecting homeowner, but about an unsuspecting cell phone
operator. I have replaced McMahan’s Cell Phone Operator (McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165) with Judith
Thomson’s Day’s End because only the latter case is free from elements of intervening agency that
might influence our judgments.
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tion helps render the driver morally responsible for the harm that
she is threatening, as it creates a morally relevant ‘association be-
tween the kind of act [that the driver voluntarily chose to perform]
and the kind of threat [that she subsequently] poses.’14
According to defenders of the Responsibility Account, the con-
scientious driver’s moral responsibility for the threat that she poses
makes her liable to defensive harm for reasons of ‘distributive fair-
ness’.15 Their thought is that it is fairer, and hence distributively less
unjust, if the driver has to suffer harm that is associated with her own
voluntary actions than that the pedestrian has to suffer harm that is
associated with someone else’s voluntary actions.16 As a morally
responsible agent, the driver chose to engage in an activity that she
ought to have known came with a risk of harm to innocent others. If
the driver finds herself in a situation where this foreseeable risk of
harm threatens to materialise, she cannot reasonably demand that
the harmful consequences of her choice should be borne by someone
other than herself. After all, the driver could have decided not to
drive, thereby avoiding the risk of harm. It follows that when we are
faced with a situation where either the driver or the pedestrian has to
die, we do not wrong the driver if we ensure the pedestrian’s safe-
ty.17
When we turn our attention to Day’s End, no comparable justi-
fication is available for shifting the harm from the neighbour to the
homeowner. The homeowner did not choose to engage in an
activity that he knew, or should have known, imposed a risk of harm
on innocent others. It is therefore no more just if the homeowner, as
opposed to his neighbour, has to suffer harm.18
III. THE FORESEEABILITY DILEMMA
Intuitively speaking, defenders of the Responsibility Account seem
right to claim that the conscientious driver was able to foresee that
her actions might cause harm in a way that the unsuspecting
homeowner was not. But the relevant difference between the two
14 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 168; see also Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’, pp. 63–64.
15 Gordon-Solmon, ‘What Makes a Person Liable’, p. 546.
16 Ibid.; McMahan, Killing in War, pp. 206–207.
17 See also Jeff McMahan, ‘Who is Morally Liable to Be Killed in War?’, Analysis 71(3) (2011): pp.
544–559, p. 551.
18 Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’, p. 64.
SUSANNE BURRI
agents is difficult to articulate. When one tries to draw a principled
distinction between the epistemic situation of the driver and that of
the homeowner, it appears that either a threat of harm was rele-
vantly foreseeable to both agents, or else it was relevantly foreseeable
to neither. I refer to this difficulty of drawing a principled line be-
tween the two agents as the Foreseeability Dilemma.
A. The No-Surprise View
In one sense, neither the harm threatened by the conscientious
driver nor the harm threatened by the unsuspecting homeowner was
foreseeable. When they made their decisions to drive to the cinema
and to switch on the light, both agents would rightly have been
surprised to learn that their preferred alternative for action threatened
significant harm. Otherwise they would both have been morally
required to forgo trivial benefits to avoid threatening such harm.
Consider the case of driving a car. We are all aware that it is
dangerous to drive if you have not received proper training, if you
do not adjust your speed in bad weather, if you text while driving, or
if you drive when sleepy or inebriated. Because of these dangers, we
are morally required to exercise due care when driving. That is, we
are not morally permitted to drive unless we have obtained proper
training, are adjusting our driving to the prevailing weather condi-
tions, and so on. If a driver violates driving-related duties of care in
the absence of a morally weighty reason in favour of doing so, she
acts negligently or recklessly, and her culpable behaviour makes her
blameworthy.19 Negligent or reckless drivers are blameworthy partly
because it comes as no surprise when their behaviour threatens
harm. On this first and admittedly vague understanding of foresee-
ability, an agent thus foreseeably puts innocent others at risk if, and
only if, it comes as no surprise if her actions threaten harm, and
foreseeably putting others at risk is permissible only if there is a
morally weighty reason in favour of doing so.
With respect to objectively unjustified harm that we risk threat-
ening while pursuing small benefits, the just introduced No-Surprise
View draws the line between foreseeable and unforeseeable threats
of harm such that this line tends to track the distinction between
19 I use the following expressions interchangeably: being blameworthy for something, being at fault
for something, and being culpable for something.
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threats of harm that we are blameworthy versus not blameworthy
for. The guiding thought behind the No-Surprise View is that fore-
seeably putting innocent others at risk is pro tanto wrong, and that
‘foreseeably’ needs to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with
this verdict.
Something like the No-Surprise View of foreseeability plays an
important role in negligent liability.20 For one thing, it is already a
well-established practice to apply a test of reasonable foreseeability to
determine whether a defendant’s breach of a duty of care should
count as the proximate cause21 of some damage that a plaintiff in-
curred. That is, only if it is deemed reasonably foreseeable—or non-
surprising—that the defendant’s breach of their duty should have
‘cause[d] the type of hazard to the type of person’22 that it actually
did cause may the breach be seen as a proximate cause of the
damage, and the defendant thus be held liable for the damage (see
also fn. 39 below). In addition, it is increasingly recognised that the
idea of reasonable foreseeability also plays an important role in
determining whether an agent was, in the first place, breaching any
duties of care.23
Theorists of tort law frequently criticise the notion of foresee-
ability for its vagueness. The recurrent worry is that foreseeability is
so ‘notoriously open-ended [that it] can be used to explain any
decision, even decisions directly opposed to each other.’24 Those
who defend the use of the notion admit that it is hard to pin down,
but argue that it nevertheless plays an ineliminable role in our
judgments about who may justly be held to account for which
damages.25
We can leave open whether foreseeability in the No-Surprise
sense is sufficiently determinate to play a productive role in tort law.
For our purposes, it matters that it is sufficiently determinate to
20 See, e.g., Benjamin Zipursky, ‘Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause’, Wake Forest
Law Review 44 (2009): pp. 1247–1275.
21 David Owen follows Henry W. Edgerton in defining a proximate cause as a ‘justly-attachable
cause.’ See David G. Owen, ‘Figuring Foreseeability’, Wake Forest Law Review 44 (2009): pp. 1277–1307,
p. 1300, fn. 119.
22 Ibid., p. 1291.
23 Zipursky, ‘Foreseeability’, esp. pp. 1255–1257.
24 Patrick Kelley, ‘Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: Descriptive
Theory and the Rule of Law’, Vanderbilt Law Review 1039 (2001): pp. 1039–1070, p. 1046. For a summary
of critical voices, see Owen, ‘Figuring Foreseeability’, pp. 1277–1280.
25 See, e.g., Owen, ‘Figuring Foreseeability’, p. 1280.
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conclude that neither the harm threatened by the conscientious dri-
ver nor the harm threatened by the unsuspecting homeowner falls
under its scope. Both the driver and the homeowner would rightly
have been surprised to learn that their actions threaten harm, and
neither agent was at fault for pursuing trivial benefits in a way that
turned out to threaten disaster. Yet there nevertheless remains a
sense in which the possibility of a harmful outcome was epistemi-
cally accessible at least to the driver at the time of acting. We all know
that even the best maintained cars can still malfunction, and that
through a series of unfortunate events, this can create a threat of
harm to innocent others. The next section discusses an interpretation
of foreseeability that captures this thought.
B. The Conceivability View
If we use the term ‘foreseeable’ as roughly interchangeable with terms
such as ‘possible’ or ‘conceivable,’ then it is clearly foreseeable that
even a conscientious driver might cause harm. This is so because we
can always come up with stories to explain why even careful drivers
might cause accidents. From an ex ante perspective, it therefore seems
reasonable consistently to assign a non-zero probability to harm
occurring as a result of anyone’s decision to drive, as well as to harm
occurring as a result of people’s actions more generally.
David Owen expresses the thought behind this Conceivability View
of foreseeability, and, by extension, the Foreseeability Condition of
moral responsibility, as follows:
‘If choice is so important [to holding people morally responsible for an outcome that they
caused], then why not ground responsibility simply on the choice to act—knowing, as we all do,
that unexpected and even unforeseeable results, if uncommon, not infrequently do occur. The
argument here might be that unforeseeable consequences, those types of consequences that
people comprehend as lying outside the realm of normal expectation but that sometimes do
occur, are then actually themselves foreseeable [...].’26
In their seminal work Causation in the Law, H.L.A. Hart and Tony
Honoré sketch an account of moral responsibility that they refer to
as outcome responsibility.27 The core idea of their account—later
fleshed out in more detail by Honoré28—resembles the thoughts
26 Owen, ‘Figuring Foreseeability’, p. 1283.
27 H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985).
28 See Tony Honoré, ‘Responsibility and Luck. The Moral Basis of Strict Liability’ in Responsibility
and Fault (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), pp. 14–40.
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voiced by Owen in the quote above. Outcome responsibility is a
form of strict responsibility that is independent of fault; an agent
acquires outcome responsibility for a harm simply by bringing it
about through her voluntary actions. Hart and Honoré argue that,
for better or worse, our identities are shaped by the outcomes of our
voluntary actions, and that this renders it appropriate that others
hold us accountable for these outcomes.29
While Hart and Honoré’s account of moral responsibility may
have its merits, it sits ill with the Responsibility Account for at least
two reasons. First, the Responsibility Account stipulates that a per-
son’s moral responsibility for a threat of objectively unjustified harm
suffices to make that person liable to potentially lethal defensive
harm. Yet Honoré is clear that an agent’s outcome responsibility for
another’s injury is insufficient, by itself, to ground liability to pay
compensation. In Honoré’s words, when conduct that is not ‘socially
undesirable’ results in harm, then ‘[a]n [agent’s] apology [to their
victim] will often be enough.’30 If this is correct, then outcome
responsibility is too weak a notion to ground defensive liability.
Second, if we construe foreseeability as conceivability—as we are
pushed to do if we accept Hart and Honoré’s account of moral
responsibility, yet still want to hang on to a Foreseeability Condi-
tion—then both the conscientious driver and the unsuspecting
homeowner are responsible for the harm that they threaten. While it
is extraordinary to threaten one’s neighbour merely by flipping a light
switch, such a freak event nevertheless remains possible.
It follows that there is a dilemma for the Responsibility Account.
On a first intuitive understanding of foreseeability, foreseeable harm
is unsurprising harm that an agent has a pro tanto reason to avoid,
and neither the driver nor the homeowner could foresee the harm
they threaten. On a second intuitive understanding, foreseeability is
likened to conceivability, and on this understanding, harm was
foreseeable to both agents. Moreover, it is not obvious that there is a
further understanding of foreseeability that allows us to draw a
principled distinction between the two agents.
29 Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law, p. lxxx. See also John Gardner, ‘Obligations and Out-
comes in the Law of Torts’ in P. Cane and J. Gardner (eds.), Relating to Responsibility. Essays for Tony
Honoré on his Eightieth Birthday (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 111–144, pp. 133–134.
30 Tony Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers’ in D. Owen (ed.), Philosophial
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 73–95, p. 82.
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C. Escaping Between the Horns of the Dilemma
We take a first step towards solving the Foreseeability Dilemma
once we realise that the difference between the conscientious driver
and the unsuspecting homeowner might be closer to a difference in
degree rather than in kind. While the epistemic accessibility of
outcomes that come as no surprise is clearly distinguishable from the
accessibility of merely conceivable outcomes, it nevertheless seems
true that the No-Surprise View and the Conceivability View merely
delimit two different segments on a continuum of epistemic accessibility
of outcomes. This continuum ranges from outcomes that an agent, at
the time of acting, reasonably perceives to be certain to outcomes
that she reasonably perceives to be impossible.
1. The Quantitative Threshold Approach
If we accept the idea of a continuum of epistemic accessibility, it
looks like settling for a quantitative threshold might provide a way out
of the Foreseeability Dilemma. The thought behind such an ap-
proach is that the morally relevant difference between the driver and
the homeowner is that the former imposes a larger risk on others
than the latter. Quantitative threshold solutions thus stipulate that
there is a cut-off point at which the risks of harm that we impose on
others become so vanishingly small that the activity that we are
engaged in no longer counts as foreseeably risk-imposing. This cut-
off point is then thought to get the homeowner, but not the driver,
off the hook.
For two reasons I believe that quantitative approaches are not
promising. The first reason is epistemic. If there is a cut-off point
below which our activities cease to be foreseeably risk-imposing,
then we should at least usually be able to establish whether we
would lie above or below this cut-off point if we decided to engage
in some activity. To be sure, if the concept of foreseeability marks
out a segment on a continuum, then it is not surprising that for any
specification of the concept, there will exist borderline cases where
we are unsure whether an outcome should count as foreseeable. But
it is a problem for the Responsibility Account if agents as a matter of
course have trouble establishing whether some activity would count
as foreseeably risk-imposing. As defenders of the Responsibility Ac-
count make clear, if an agent engages in a foreseeably risk-imposing
activity, this means that there is a morally relevant ‘association be-
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tween the kind of act [the agent chooses to perform] and the kind of
threat [she subsequently] poses.’31 This suggests that a foreseeably
risk-imposing activity is an activity that an agent can usually discern,
and hence choose to perform, as such. Yet if we take the idea of a
quantitative cut-off point seriously, it is difficult to know whether an
agent falls above or below it whenever she exercises a potentially dan-
gerous activity while exercising due care.
For illustrative purposes, suppose that an activity is foreseeably
risk-imposing if there is a higher than one in a million probability
that pursuing the activity for one hour will lead to substantial harm
to an innocent other. If I have a gentle dog and I am an experienced
dog person, does the probability of harm that I impose on others by
walking my dog fall above or below this threshold? Even if the
available data suggests that ‘dog walking’ is a foreseeably risk-im-
posing activity, the fact that I am experienced and my dog is gentle
might mean that my dog-walking imposes only morally insignificant
risks. There are further factors that seem relevant to determining
what risks I impose on others, such as where I walk my dog, whether
I keep him on a leash at all times, and what breed my dog is. Even if
I know where the relevant cut-off point for foreseeability lies, it is
extremely unlikely that I will have access to sufficiently fine-grained
data to estimate accurately, and in good faith, whether I exceed it
when walking my dog.
To make matters worse—and this is the second reason against
adopting a quantitative threshold approach to solving the Foresee-
ability Dilemma—the difficulties involved in quantifying risks are not
merely epistemic. If we assume that the size of the risk that my dog-
walking imposes is belief-independent, in the sense that different rea-
soners, when presented with the same facts, should all reach the
same conclusion about the level of risk imposed, then there will not
usually be a uniquely right conclusion that they all should reach.
The most useful belief-independent interpretation of what it
means to impose a probability of harm is offered by finite frequentism.
Roughly speaking, finite frequentism defines the probability of a
particular harm as the relative frequency with which the harm oc-
curs in a relevant reference class. If we take all the experienced dog
walkers with gentle dogs who walked their dogs in 2018—assuming
31 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 168.
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we can render the terms ‘experienced dog walker’ and ‘gentle dog’
sufficiently determinate—and we divide the number of harmful
incidents by the total number of dog walking hours, this yields the
frequentist probability of harm for this particular reference class. The
problem with this intuitively appealing procedure is that there is no
uniquely fitting reference class for any particular instance where an
agent is contemplating whether to engage in some activity in some
particular manner.32 The risk of harm that I impose on others qua
‘experienced dog walker who walked their gentle dog in 2018’ may
be quite different from the risk that I impose on others qua ‘expe-
rienced dog walker who walked their gentle dog between 2008–
2018’. This so-called reference class problem means that frequently
there may be no fact of the matter about the size of the risk that an
agent imposes if she chooses to engage in some activity in a par-
ticular manner.33 A quantitative threshold approach thus does not
help us pin down a conspicuous ‘association between the kind of act
[a foreseeably risk-imposing agent chooses to perform] and the kind
of threat [she subsequently] poses.’34
2. The Duties of Care Approach
Luckily, I believe that we can do better. I propose that we should
think of activities as foreseeably risk-imposing, or as being of the risk-
imposing type,35 just in case performing them is morally permissible in
the evidence-relative sense36 only if agents abide by relatively well-
defined duties of care. On this proposal, driving a car or walking a dog
are always foreseeably risk-imposing activities, simply because we are
32 See, e.g., Alan Hájek, ‘The Reference Class Problem Is Your Problem Too’’, Synthese 156 (2007):
pp. 563–585.
33 Someone attracted to the quantitative approach might jump to its defence here. While the
reference class problem frequently makes it impossible to precisely quantify the size of the risk that an
agent imposes, it may in many such cases still be possible to delimit a set of plausible reference classes, and
to calculate what risks an agent imposes as a member of these different references classes. It might then
make sense to refer to an activity as foreseeably risk-imposing if, for a sufficient proportion of relevant
reference classes, the risk that an agent imposes falls above the relevant cut-off point. I grant that such
strategies help alleviate the metaphysical issues just introduced, but only at the cost of exacerbating the
epistemic worries raised earlier.
34 McMahan, Killing in War, p. 168.
35 McMahan introduces this second term as an alternative to foreseeably risk-imposing in ‘The Basis of
Moral Liability’, p. 397.
36 Derek Parfit refers to an act as morally permissible in the evidence-relative sense ‘just when this act
would be [morally permissible] in the ordinary sense if we believed what the available evidence gives us
decisive reason to believe, and these beliefs were true.’ See Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Volume I
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 151.
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morally required to guard against certain dangers when performing
them.
The general thought behind this proposal is as follows. Over time,
we come to understand that certain activities are associated with
dangers. This understanding might be based simply on the observa-
tion of correlations—we might for example observe that individuals
who like to experiment with chemicals frequently start uncontrolled
fires in their backyards.37 Alternatively, our understanding might run
deeper: we might appreciate how certain causal processes that are
associated with the activity can lead to harmful outcomes unless
carefully guarded against. To continue with the aforementioned
example, we might understand what chemical reactions lead to
combustion, as well as the conditions under which fires will spread.
When we come to understand that an activity is associated with
certain dangers, it remains morally permissible to perform the
activity in the pursuit of our daily lives if, and only if, two conditions
obtain. First, the activity serves a morally valuable end, in the sense
that being able to engage in it contributes to our ability to lead
flourishing lives.38 Second, we find ways of managing the dangers
associated with the activity by imposing certain standards of due
care. I contend that it is this subset of activities—the activities that
we may permissibly perform only if we abide by certain duties of
care—that should count as foreseeably risk-imposing.
A strength of this proposed solution is that it establishes a clear
connection between the kind of act that a foreseeably risk-imposing
agent chooses to perform and the harm she may subsequently be
held morally responsible for. If an agent performs an activity that
comes with duties of care, then even if the agent goes to great
lengths to ensure that she does not put innocent others at risk, she
37 The two problems raised for the quantitative threshold approach (see section 3.3.1) do not stand
in the way of this kind of insight. The epistemic problem does not arise because we rightly disregard the
manner in which an activity is performed when we observe correlations. When we come to understand
that an activity is dangerous based on the harmful outcomes that it is correlated with, we simply
observe the people who engage in the activity, and deem the activity dangerous if, and only if, engaging
in it is associated with a harmful outcome sufficiently frequently. The metaphysical problem does not arise
because we are free to define—sensibly by following common language use—what counts as performing
the activity. Simply stipulating what counts as performing the activity is admissible as long as we refrain
from claiming that every agent who performs the activity thereby imposes a particular risk of harm. To
put the same point differently, when we call an activity dangerous based on observed correlations, we
make a statement about the average person performing the activity, while allowing that there might be
large variations between individuals. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
38 See John Oberdiek, Imposing Risk (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 131–
154.
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still has reason to assume that she thereby only minimises, but does
not fully eliminate, the dangers associated with the activity. Even if
there is no fact of the matter about the size of the risk that an agent
imposes if she engages in a potentially dangerous activity while
abiding by relevant duties of care, the fact that the agent is morally
required to exercise due care gives us reason to believe that the
activity comes with risks that an innocuous activity lacks. This
provides the agent with a—possibly only very weak—moral reason
in favour of avoiding the activity. Moreover, it is implied by the idea
of duties of care that an agent should be aware that such duties apply
to her, as the agent is at fault if she violates her duties by behaving
negligently or recklessly. If a foreseeably risk-imposing activity is an
activity that an agent may permissibly perform only if she exercises
due care, an agent should thus be able to recognise foreseeably risk-
imposing activities as such.
But the proposed solution also calls for clarification and refine-
ment. First, note that there are certain dangerous activities the
dangers of which we are not yet aware, such that there are no duties
of care that a reasonable agent would recognise as being associated
with these activities. For example, suppose that inhaling someone
else’s bad breath can cause lung cancer, though we currently lack
medical evidence for this. If this were the case, then talking to people
when you have bad breath would be an example for an activity that
is dangerous in this unidentified manner. I contend that activities of
this type should not count as foreseeably risk-imposing. An activity is
foreseeably risk-imposing only if it is reasonably epistemically acces-
sible to an agent at the time of acting that engaging in the activity
will expose others to dangers that the agent can manage, but not
completely eliminate. Only if this condition is satisfied is the activity
intelligibly avoidable for being of the risk-imposing type, so that it
might be fairer to shift the potential costs of the activity on the agent
who decided to undertake the activity as opposed to letting them fall
where they may.
Second, suppose that there is an activity that comes with certain
duties of care because of its associated dangers, and an agent decides
to perform the activity while exercising due care. Further suppose
that this agent’s conduct now threatens unjustified harm, but the
reason why it does so is not related to the dangers associated with
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the activity. For example, suppose that a recovering heart patient is
sitting on his porch when you drive by in your car (at a steady and
moderate speed, and on a road where driving is permissible). As it
happens, the noise of your engine startles the patient, and he has a
heart attack. Neither the patient nor you had any reason to expect
this outcome. It seems to me that in such a case, we cannot hold you
morally responsible for the harm that you caused. The harm that
materialises is no more associated with your driving than the harm
that threatens to materialise in Day’s End is associated with the
homeowner’s decision to flip the switch; both harms are freak events
that an agent has no reason to attend to when deciding whether to
engage in the relevant activities. If this is correct, then we should say
that according to the Responsibility Account, an unexcused agent is
morally responsible for a threat of harm that her foreseeably risk-im-
posing activity causes if, and only if, the threat of harm is due to a
danger that she was morally required to manage by exercising due
care.39
With these two refinements, we get the following definitions:
An activity is of the risk-imposing type or foreseeably risk-imposing if, and only if, performing
the activity is morally permissible in the evidence-relative sense only if an agent abides by certain
duties of care.
An otherwise unexcused agent is morally responsible for a threat of objectively unjustified
harm that she poses by engaging in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity if, and only if, the threat
of harm is due to a danger that is associated with the activity. A danger is associated with an
activity if some of the duties of care that accompany the activity are in place to guard against this
danger.
As I see it, these definitions help flesh out the Responsibility Account
in a plausible manner. They clarify that there is a principled and
potentially morally relevant difference between the conscientious
driver and the unsuspecting homeowner. In what follows, I
investigate whether the difference between the two agents is
morally significant in the way that defenders of the Responsibility
Account claim it is.
39 In tort law, a similar distinction is made, in that defendants are held liable for harms only if these
harms are considered to be within the risk of a particular conduct (strict liability) or breach of duty
(negligent liability). See section 3.1 above.
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IV. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ENGAGING IN A FORESEEABLY RISK-
IMPOSING ACTIVITY
A. Voluntary Choice and Control
Defenders of the Responsibility Account argue that if a fixed amount of
harm has to be suffered either by a foreseeable risk-imposer or her
potential victim, then it is fairer if the harm is suffered by the risk-
imposer. Their thought is that a foreseeable risk-imposer, unlike her
potential victim, had at least some morally relevant control over the
threat’s existence.40 As McMahan puts it with respect to the consci-
entious driver,
‘[T]he driver ha[s]made herself liable by choosing to set a couple of tons of steel inmotion as ameans
of pursuing her ends, knowing that this would involve a very small risk of killing an innocent
person. Again, a voluntary choice with a foreseeable risk [...] is the basis of [defensive] liability.’41
This quote suggests that the driver had control over the threat’s
existence because she made a voluntary choice to engage in a
foreseeably risk-imposing activity. But what makes her choice
voluntary? First—and this is something McMahan makes explicit—it
must have been epistemically accessible to the agent that she was
choosing to engage in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity.
Second—and this is left implicit in the passage just quoted—the
agent must have had access to reasonable alternatives for action that
would not have been similarly risk-imposing. Only if she had access
to such alternatives was it reasonably avoidable for her to engage in
an activity of the risk-imposing type.42 It is difficult to determine
what makes an alternative reasonable to choose. For the problem at
hand, I suggest the following: if it is morally permissible to engage in
some activity, then available alternatives are reasonable to choose if,
and only if, they are not significantly inferior in terms of the
opportunities for welfare they offer to the agent.43 By contrast, if
engaging in an activity is morally impermissible, then permissible
40 See, e.g., Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’, p. 63; McMahan, ‘Self-Defense Against
Innocent Threats’, p. 392.
41 McMahan, ibid.; emphases added.
42 This second condition is mentioned e.g. in Otsuka, ‘Killing the Innocent’, p. 91, and is discussed,
albeit inconclusively, in Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’, pp. 63–65. See also Gordon-
Solmon, ‘What Makes a Person Liable’, pp. 558–559.
43 More precisely, I assume that alternatives for action are reasonable to choose whenever they are
not significantly inferior when evaluated in terms of the right currency of distributive justice, which for
ease of exposition I assume to be opportunities for welfare. None of my arguments depend on this
assumption.
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alternatives are always reasonable, even if they offer clearly inferior
opportunities for welfare to the agent.
On this specification of what itmeans for a choice to be voluntary, it
seems plausible that the driver’s voluntary choice to drive might
ground her defensive liability, as there is an intelligible sense in which
the driver controls whether a threat of objectively unjustified harm
might come into existence. Proponents of the Responsibility Account
appeal to luck egalitarian ideas to substantiate their claim that it is just
to hold agents to account for the consequences of their voluntary
choices.44 In what follows, I turn to luck egalitarianism and argue that,
on closer inspection, it does not generally support the claim that it is
fairer if foreseeable risk-imposers, as opposed to their potential victims,
have to absorb the harms that they threaten.
B. Luck Egalitarianism
The basic tenet of luck egalitarian theories of distributive justice is
that ‘it is unjust if some people are worse off than others through
[sheer] bad luck.’45 If a person is worse off than others due to her
voluntary choices, then she is worse off than others for reasons other
than her bad luck. Seemingly very much in line with the justificatory
rationale behind the Responsibility Account, luck egalitarians are
committed to the idea that a key reason to favour equality—namely
the unfairness of differential luck—is absent when people’s differ-
ential fates are the result of factors within their control.
The starting point of all luck egalitarian theories of distributive
justice is one of substantive, or fair, equality of opportunity.46 For luck
egalitarians, it is a requirement of justice that everyone’s choice
set—the options that people choose from—is equally valuable in terms
of the opportunities for welfare that it provides (cf. fn. 43). Against such
a background of equal opportunity, luck egalitarians are then com-
mitted to the idea that it is just to hold people to account for their
voluntary choices, thus respecting themas responsible agents.47Toput
44 See Gordon-Solmon, ‘What Makes a Person Liable’; Otsuka, ‘The Moral-Responsibility Account’,
pp. 63–64.
45 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), p. 1.
46 See, e.g., Richard Arneson, ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’, Philosophical Studies, 56
(1989): pp. 77–93.
47 See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2011), p. 4.
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the same point differently, if some people end upworse off than others
through their voluntary choices fromequally valuable choice sets, then
there is no demand of justice to eliminate the resulting inequalities. To
the contrary, it would be unjust if those who made more prudent
choices weremadeworse off in order to improve the fate of those who
were imprudent. The situation is different if someone’s opportunities
for welfare are reduced through sheer bad luck. In this case, it is unjust
that the unlucky person is worse off than others.
Because inequalities are considered unjust if they are due to bad
luck, it might seem that on a luck egalitarian picture, it is just as
unjust if the conscientious driver as opposed to the pedestrian has to
suffer harm. After all, the driver is unlucky: most conscientious
driving does not result in a threat of harm. While this worry is
important, luck egalitarians have a response to it. The response
draws on Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between brute luck and option
luck. According to Dworkin, it is unjust if some people are worse off
than others through bad brute luck, but it need not be unjust if some
people are worse off than others as a result of their bad option luck.
As Dworkin defines it, option luck relates to foreseeable outcomes
that are the results of risky actions that an agent could reasonably
have avoided, whereas brute luck relates to outcomes an agent could
not have similarly avoided:
‘Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone
gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might
have declined. Brute luck is a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate
gambles. If I buy a stock on the exchange that rises, then my option luck is good. If I am hit by a
falling meteorite whose course could not have been predicted, then my bad luck is brute [...].’48
The main reason for distinguishing between brute luck and option
luck is as follows. To respect people as responsible agents, a society
needs to provide them with access to meaningful options. This
includes providing them with access to gambles, i.e. alternatives for
action where it is epistemically accessible to the agent that things
could turn out better or worse, and where the agent is able to assign
at least rough probability estimates to the likelihood with which
different outcomes might occur. When an agent has access to a
gamble, and the agent chooses to engage in it even though she could
reasonably have declined it for a safe alternative, then it is not unjust
48 Ronald Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 10
(1981): pp. 283–345, p. 293.
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if the gambler ends up worse off or better off than other gamblers,
just as it is not unjust if the gambler ends up worse off or better off
than those who chose a safe alternative instead. If the inequalities
that result from gambles were seen as unjust and in need of
elimination, then the redistribution that would have to take place in
the name of distributive justice would erode the option to gamble,
thus restricting the choices people have access to.
Applied to the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity, the
thought here is that engaging in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity
means choosing to gamble. When engaging in such an activity
threatens harm, the agent suffers bad option luck, and it is not unjust
to fail to correct this. Importantly, though, this is a valid way of
looking at things from a luck egalitarian perspective only if a number
of demanding background conditions obtain.
C. Equality of Opportunity and Reasonable Avoidability
From McMahan’s description of the case, we know very little about
the conscientious driver and the pedestrian whose life she threatens.
But suppose the following details are correct: the driver and the
pedestrian both live in a small town. The driver has a disability that
makes it painful for her to walk. Because of its associated risks, she
dislikes driving. Hence she always thinks twice about leaving her
house, and goes to great lengths to drive safely. The pedestrian, by
contrast, has no disability. He loves walking and cycling, and does
not even have a driver’s licence. Even in the absence of the option to
drive, his choice set is more valuable to him in terms of opportu-
nities for welfare than the driver’s choice set is to the driver.
Fleshing out the situation in this way clarifies that it is generally49
fairer if harm is borne by the person who created an unjustified
threat of harm by engaging in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity
only if everyone enjoys equal access to opportunities for welfare. In
the absence of such equal opportunities, it is always possible that
some people will be able to reach a certain level of welfare without
engaging in any foreseeably risk-imposing activities, whereas others
49 The qualifier ‘generally’ is needed because it is always possible that the pedestrian’s choice set is
inferior to the driver’s. When this is the case, it will be fairer to shift harm from the pedestrian to the
driver. But this will be fairer not primarily because the driver is responsible for the harm that she
threatens, but because it equalises opportunities for welfare between the driver and the pedestrian if the
harm is apportioned to the driver.
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will be able to reach a comparable level of welfare only if they
choose to engage in activities of the risk-imposing type.
Describing the driver as disadvantaged also helps clarify the impor-
tance of reasonable avoidability. Suppose that if the driver engages in
driving, then on expectation she is aswell off as the pedestrian,whodoes
not drive. But if she doesn’t drive, then she is much worse off. In this
case, driving is not reasonably avoidable for her, because she does not
have access to safe alternatives to driving that present her with similarly
valuable opportunities for welfare. In the absence of such alternatives, it
does not seem just to burden the driver with the costs of a gamble that
she would gladly have passed up in favour of a safe alternative.
In sum, we are entitled to conclude that engaging in a foreseeably
risk-imposing activity can be described as taking a gamble that agents
may justly be held responsible for only if the background conditions of
equal opportunity and reasonable avoidability obtain.
D. Specified Gambles and Shared Expectations
Imagine a homogeneous society where all agents are the same in terms
of their abilities, their preferences, and their choice sets. In this
society, substantive equality of opportunity is realised, as everyone
has access to the same opportunities for welfare. Suppose that in this
society, driving is a reasonably avoidable gamble. Compared to the
safe alternative of taking public transport, it is more convenient, but
it comes with risks of harm that drivers are asked to internalise. In
terms of expected welfare, driving is slightly more attractive than its
safe alternative, but the difference is small. Now suppose that in this
society, everyone chooses to drive to a similar extent. Most people
drive without ever creating a threat of unjustified harm. But now
suppose that McMahan’s conscientious driver is a member of this
society, and that one fine evening, her decision to drive threatens a
pedestrian. Is it correct to say that it is fairer if the driver, as opposed
to her potential victim, should die as a result of the driver’s choice?
Here is what the pedestrian might say, inspired by the justification
behind the Responsibility Account: ‘Yes, it is less unjust if the driver
dies. She’smade a voluntary choice to drivewhen she could have taken
the subway instead. When she decided to drive, she knew that driving
is a risk-imposing activity. Because she chose to engage in an avoidable
gamble, it is not unjust if we hold her to account for the outcome of this
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gamble. At the very least, it is less unjust if she is worse off as an
outcome of a gamble she took than if I amworse off as an outcome of a
gamble she took.’ In the context of a homogeneous society, these words
ring hollow. True, the driver chose to drive. But the pedestrian would
have made a similar decision in her place. By assumption, both the
driver and the pedestrian regularly choose to drive, and for under-
standable reasons: the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the
expected costs. It is true that there is a threat of harm only because the
driver decided to drive to the cinema on this particular evening. In this
sense, it can be argued that a natural lottery has taken place which has
singled out the driver: it just so happens that her decision to drive has
resulted in a threat of objectively unjustified harm, and wemay as well
hold her to account for this. But if this is all that we can say, then a
similar argument can be made with respect to the unsuspecting
homeowner: it just so happens that his decision to flip the light switch
has resulted in a threat of objectively unjustified harm, and we may as
well attach the harm to the personwhose choice has created the threat.
In other words, in the homogeneous society that I have just sketched,
the difference between the driver and the pedestrian is reduced to the
fact that the former’s actions threaten objectively unjustified harm,
whereas the latter’s do not.With respect to their voluntary choices, the
driver and the pedestrian are indistinguishable.50
To see this crucial point more clearly, consider Dworkin’s example
of investing on the stock market. Suppose that two investors both
conduct a similar amount of research and then decide to invest part of
their wealth in stocks instead of keeping it in a savings account. Further
suppose that one investor makes a profit while the other has to take a
loss. In such a case, there is no sense in which it is more just if we leave
the situation as it is instead of reversing it. If there is a reason why we
should leave the situation as it is, it is tied to considerations other than a
commitment to holding people responsible for their choices (e.g.
efficiency), as both investors’ choices were relevantly the same.
Of course, the driver and the pedestrian needn’t be the same in
terms of their voluntary choices. Once we move away from the
assumption of a perfectly homogeneous society, there are certain
conditions under which it is less unjust if the driver has to suffer
50 In tort law, George Fletcher argues for a regime of negligence (as opposed to strict) liability where
risk imposition is symmetrical for reasons that mirror the reasons presented in this paragraph. See
George Fletcher, ‘Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory’, Harvard Law Review 85 (1972): pp. 537–573.
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lethal harm. But surprisingly it might also be the case that it is less
unjust if the pedestrian has to suffer harm. To see what I mean,
suppose that in a society with heterogenous agents, we can design
two different sets of rules. Under the first set of rules, we ask drivers
to absorb all driving-related costs. Under the second set of rules, we
determine that driving-related costs which are the result of consci-
entious driving should fall where they may. Further suppose that
both sets of rules, thanks to further differences in their specifications,
are compatible with substantive equality of opportunity, and would
present agents only with reasonably avoidable gambles. Finally,
suppose that no matter which set of rules we implement, some
people will decide to drive frequently, others will decide to drive
rarely, and again others will rely exclusively on public transport.
Which set of rules should we implement as more just?
The crucial point is that luck egalitarianism is indifferent: it re-
gards the two sets of rules as equally just. It is true that depending on
which set of rules we implement, the members of our society will
have access to different options, as the rules that we implement
specify the gambles that individuals have access to. If we implement
the first set of rules, then choosing to be a driver will be a slightly less
attractive gamble; if we implement the second set of rules, then this
renders walking slightly less attractive. But luck egalitarian principles
do not help us determine which options it is morally most valuable
to have access to. As Serena Olsaretti puts it, ‘[...] even if we accept
the importance of holding individuals responsible for their choices, it
is an open question what consequences those choices should have,
and [our view on what consequences individuals’ choices should
have] presupposes substantive moral convictions that are indepen-
dent of our commitment to responsibility itself.’51
It follows that we cannot appeal to luck egalitarian ideas to settle
the question whether agents should be held accountable for what-
ever threats of objectively unjustified harm that they pose through
51 Serena Olsaretti, ‘Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, New Series, 109 (2009): pp. 165–188, p. 167. Zofia Stemplowska argues similarly that no luck
egalitarian theory is complete unless its commitment to responsibility is complemented with principles
that determine what options agents should have access to. See Zofia Stemplowska, ‘Making Justice
Sensitive to Responsibility’, Political Studies 57 (2009): pp. 237–259, and Zofia Stemplowska, ‘Rescuing
Luck Egalitarianism’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 44(4) (2013): pp. 402–419. Others who agree include
Shlomi Segall, Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), ch. 4 and Alex
Voorhoeve, ‘May a Government Mandate More Comprehensive Health Insurance than Citizens Want
for Themselves?’, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 4 (2018): pp. 167–191, p. 178.
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engaging in foreseeably risk-imposing activities. The question whe-
ther agents should be held responsible in this way is logically inde-
pendent of luck egalitarian justice, in the sense that however we
answer it, this answer will be compatible with the luck egalitarian
commitment to holding people responsible for their choices. Whe-
ther foreseeable risk-imposers should have to internalise the costs of
their behaviour might depend, for example, on what would promote
the general welfare.52
Importantly, luck egalitarianism is not indifferent on whether we
should hold people responsible for the choices that they were presented
with. From a luck egalitarian perspective, it is important that agents
are aware of the choices in their choice set—that they know their
alternatives for action, and that it is clear to them what consequences
are attached to which alternatives. In fact, it is precisely the point of
the luck egalitarian commitment to holding people responsible that
we all have to live with the consequences of our choices in line with
what we reasonably expected these consequences to be. It follows that
whichever set of rules we decide to implement, it is important that
agents are made aware of the rules that apply to them. If agents in a
society characterised by equal opportunity and reasonable avoid-
ability of gambles know that pedestrians are asked to absorb certain
driving-related costs, then it is precisely this fact that renders it just
that pedestrians, as opposed to drivers, have to absorb these costs.
At this point, it might be objected that something has gone
wrong. Even if it is possible to attach driving-related harms to
pedestrians, thus turning walking into a less attractive option than it
would otherwise be, there seems to be something unjust about
burdening pedestrians with such harm. After all, it seems that if
pedestrians have to absorb driving-related harms, then drivers are
permitted to inflict non-consensual harm on pedestrians. This seems
highly counterintuitive. But note that drivers are not permitted to
52 From a perspective that is concerned with promoting the general welfare, economists argue that
asking agents to internalise the costs of their self-interested activities helps fix the extent to which these
activities are pursued at its social optimum. This provides a welfarist consideration in favour of
implementing the set of rules that the Responsibility Account advocates, at least with respect to the
foreseeably risk-imposing activities that agents undertake mostly for their own sake. Having said that, it
is easily imaginable that it would detract from the general welfare if people started arming themselves
so as to be able to defend themselves against perceived threats posed by others’ self-interested risk-
imposing activities (see Seth Lazar, ‘Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defense’, Ethics 119(4)
(2009): pp. 699–728, pp. 718–722). These and other welfare effects would have to be estimated and
balanced against each other.
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inflict non-consensual harm. What they are permitted to do is engage
in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity while exercising due care. Pre-
dictably, this will sometimes result in a threat of harm that is
objectively unjustified, and this raises the question of who should
suffer this harm. In a society where it is assumed that everyone has
an equally valuable choice set, with gambles that they can reasonably
avoid, there is nothing unjust about asking pedestrians to absorb this
harm, especially if independent moral reasons speak in favour of
such an allocation.53
In sum, we can say that a commitment to holding people
responsible for the consequences of their choices speaks in favour of
foreseeable risk-imposers’ liability to defensive harm if, and only if,
the risk-imposers live in a society where:
1. there is substantive equality of opportunity;54
2. the gambles that agents take by engaging in foreseeably risk-imposing
activities are reasonably avoidable;
3. it is common knowledge that foreseeable risk-imposers are expected to
absorb all objectively unjustified harm that their actions might threa-
ten;
4. there are moral reasons independent of the value of holding people
responsible that speak in favour of holding foreseeable risk-imposers
accountable in this way;55
5. there is heterogeneity among agents, such that foreseeable risk impo-
sitions cannot be characterised as reciprocal.
These five conditions do not generally obtain in the world that we
live in, neither with respect to driving nor with respect to other
foreseeably risk-imposing activities that we permissibly engage in. It
follows that for the world that we live in, the Responsibility Account
generally fails to provide a justification in favour of shifting the costs
53 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this issue.
54 As mentioned in footnote 49, it can sometimes be fairer to burden a foreseeable risk-imposer with
the harm that she threatens even in the absence of equal opportunity, namely when doing so helps
equalise opportunities between the foreseeable risk-imposer and her potential victim. But what makes it
fairer in such cases to burden the risk-imposer is not related to her responsibility for the harmful
outcome. See also footnote 55 below. I thank Alex Voorhoeve for pressing me on these issues.
55 Such reasons (which might for example be welfarist in nature; see footnote 52) might speak in
favour of holding foreseeable risk-imposers accountable even in the absence of equal opportunity and
the reasonable avoidability of gambles. Having said that, if we, as a society, justifiedly decide to heed
these reasons and hold foreseeable risk-imposers accountable even in an imperfectly just society, what
justifies our decision are the relevant independent reasons, and not the luck egalitarian thought that it is
not unjust if people are worse off as a result of their voluntary choices.
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of foreseeably risk-imposing activities back on the agents who chose
to engage in these activities in a morally permissible manner.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have critically examined the Moral Responsibility
Account of Liability to Defensive Harm. I have argued that while we
can make sense of the notion of a foreseeably risk-imposing activity that
the account relies on, the account’s justificatory rationale has force
only in the presence of demanding background conditions. More
precisely, an agent’s choice to engage in a foreseeably risk-imposing
activity can successfully ground her subsequent liability to defensive
harm only in a society with substantive equality of opportunity in which
engaging in a foreseeably risk-imposing activity represents a reason-
ably avoidable gamble.
Moreover, if what I have argued is correct, then we cannot appeal
to the value of holding people responsible for the consequences of
their choices to settle the question whether foreseeable risk-imposers
should be held responsible for whatever objectively unjustified harm
that they might threaten. To decide what consequences should at-
tach to which choices, we need to consult our ‘substantive moral
convictions that are independent of our commitment to responsi-
bility itself.’56
As I see it, even if our moral convictions that are independent of
our commitment to responsibility lead us to conclude that foresee-
able risk-imposers should be asked to internalise whatever harm that
they might threaten, this would not provide us with a decisive
reason in favour of accepting the Responsibility Account. As this
paper has attempted to show, the Responsibility Account’s appeal to
responsibility has justificatory force only if demanding background
conditions obtain. But I believe that many of us—and I count myself
among this group—share the intuition that liability to defensive
harm is a much more robust notion, in the sense that the factors
which render an agent liable to defensive harm are not very
dependent on societal background conditions. For those among us
who consider such robustness a desideratum for a liability account, it
is noteworthy that so-called culpability accounts of liability to
56 Olsaretti, ‘Responsibility and the Consequences of Choice’, p. 167.
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defensive harm satisfy it.57 On culpability accounts, the key feature
that grounds an agent’s liability to defensive harm is the agent’s
culpability with respect to a threat of objectively unjustified harm. If
an agent acts culpably, the agent by definition chooses an action she
could reasonably have avoided—in fact, she chooses an action for
which it was epistemically accessible to her that she ought to have
avoided it. When the agent’s trespass results in a threat of harm that
would not have occurred had the agent acted permissibly, it seems
plausible to think that the agent lacks a reasonable complaint against
being burdened with the costs of her trespass. Importantly, this holds
true no matter how distributively just or unjust a society the tres-
passing agent lives in.
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